Weighing In Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the Recognition of Obesity as a Disability Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act by Taussig, William C
Boston College Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 4
7-1-1994
Weighing In Against Obesity Discrimination:
Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental
Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the
Recognition of Obesity as a Disability Under the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans With
Disabilities Act
William C. Taussig
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Disability Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William C. Taussig, Weighing In Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of
Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the Recognition of Obesity as a Disability Under the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 35 B.C.L. Rev. 927 (1994),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol35/iss4/4
WEIGHING IN AGAINST OBESITY
DISCRIMINATION: COOK v. RHODE
ISLAND, DEPARMENT OF MENTAL
HEALTH, RETARDATION, AND HOSPITALS
AND THE RECOGNITION OF OBESITY
AS A DISABILITY UNDER THE
REHABILITATION ACT AND THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
In November 1988, Bonnie Cook, at five foot three inches tall and
over 300 pounds, applied for an available position as an institution
attendant for the mentally retarded CIA-MR") at a residential facility
run by the state of Rhode Island) Although she had previously worked
for more than five years as an IA-MR for the same facility and had
maintained an unblemished performance record at a similar weight,
Ms. Cook's application was rejected, and she was told that she was too
fat for the job.' Ms. Cook, however, did not go quietly.' Rather, claiming
discrimination on the basis of her weight, she managed to tip the scales
of justice in her favor in the first federal court decision to acknowledge
obesity as a disability under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 4
Discrimination based on weight is a widespread phenomenon in
the United States workplace." Many obese workers are underemployed
or unemployed because of discrimination against them on account of
their weight." Although Congress has not spoken directly to the issue
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, Cook v. Rhode Island, Dept of Mental Health, Retardation,
and Hosps. ("MHRH"), 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1093).
2 See Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of MHRH, 10 F.3d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir, 1993); Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellee at 9-10, Cook, 10 F.3d 17 (No. 93-1093).
9 Cook, 10 F.3d at 21.
4 See id. at 20, 28 (in reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit upheld the district court's
order endorsing a jury determination that Ms. Cook's obesity constituted a statutory disability);
see also Tipping the Scales of Justice, PEOPLE, Dec. 13, 1993, at 99.
5 See Steven L. Gorunaker et al., Social and Economic Consequences of Overweight in Adolescence
and Young Adulthood, 329 New ENG. J. Minn. 1008, 1011 (1993); Charles A. Register & Donald
R. Williams, Wage Effects of Obesity Among Young Workers, 7.1 Soc. Sct. Q. 130, 139-40 (1990)
(authors noted that wages of obese women were more greatly affected than thoSe of obese men).
11 See Esther Rothblum et al., Results of the NAAFA Survey on Employment Discrimination
(Fall 1987) (unpublished survey available from National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance
("NAAFA")) [hereinafter "NAAFA Survey"]. NAAFA is a non-profit corporation working for size
acceptance that provides educational and referral services to its members and the general public.
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ofjob bias against the overweight, it has enacted legislation prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability, a term which it has explained
should be interpreted expansively.' And while no court had previously
placed obesity within the federal definition of disability, some state
courts have granted protection to the overweight under similarly worded
state laws.'
In November 1993, the First Circuit, in Cook v. Rhode Island,
Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, became the
first United States Court of Appeals to acknowledge morbid obesity as
a disability under federal disability law.' The First Circuit reasoned that
conditions such as obesity that are arguably voluntary or mutable are
not preempted per se from the protection of federal disability law.'°
Additionally, the court recognized that the negative stereotypes that
American society associates with the obese are evidence that society
perceives obesity as a disability." The First Circuit, however, limited its
holding to the facts of Bonnie Cook's case and, therefore, to morbid
obesity: 2
This Note analyzes the Cook decision in light of previously existing
disability law and argues for the inclusion of all classes of obesity within
the statutory definition of disability as a necessary means of protecting
the overweight from discrimination. Section I explores the medical
information regarding the disease of obesity and the extent to which
negative stereotypes have affected the overweight. 13 Section II exam-
ines the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act
and state statutory disability law." Specifically, section II focuses on the
statutory definition of "disability" in light of legislative history and
administrative regulations which have commented on the scope of this
term. Section III reviews the state and federal case law leading up to
For more information, contact:
NAAFA
P.O. Box 188620
Sacramento, CA 95818
(916) 558-6880.
7 See 45 C.F.R. part 84 App. A, Subpart A(3) (1993). See info notes 89-94 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the legislative intent concerning the statutory definition of disability.
8 See infra notes 117-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of relevant state case law.
9 See Cook, 10 F.3d at 20,28. Morbid obesity is defined as a body weight that is more than
twice one's optimal weight or more than 100 pounds over one's optimal weight Id. at 20 n.l.
to See id. at 23-24 & n.7.
11 See id. at 23,27,28.
22 See id. at 28.
18 See infra notes 18-63 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 64-116 and accompanying text_
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the Cook decision." Section IV sets out the details of the district court
and First Circuit opinions in the Cook case." Finally, Section V analyzes
the First Circuit's reasoning and argues for the extension of the Gook
holding beyond morbid obesity to obesity in general and for the pro-
hibition of discrimination on the basis of weight.' 7
L OBESITY
A. Obesity as a Disease
The disease of obesity is defined as excessive levels of adipose
tissue—fat cells—in the body." Obesity is classified into three levels
based on the percentage one's body weight is over the normal body
weight for one's height: mild obesity being a weight 20-40% over the
norm; moderate obesity being a weight 41-100% over the norm; and
morbid obesity being a weight more than twice the norm or more than
100 pounds over the norm.' 9 Studies show that thirty-two million Amer-
icans (approximately twenty-eight percent) are overweight and that 1.5
million Americans (approximately one percent) are morbidly obese. 29
Although the exact causes of obesity are not fully understood, the
medical community considers the disease to be the result of physiologi-
cal, psychological and environmental factors." Physiological causes of
obesity include dysfunction of the metabolic system, lack of appetite
suppression signals to the brain, genetic disposition and an abnormal
number and size of fat cells. 22 Psychological causes of obesity include
compulsive eating disorders and a need to support a self-image of
15
 See infra notes 117-75 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 176-252 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 253-90 and accompanying text.
18 Barbara Luken., Biology of Obesity,  in PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPEC'T'S OF OnEsrry: A HANDBOOK
1, 1 (Benjamin 13. Wolman ed., 1982).
"'See Cook, 10 F.3d at 20 n.1; Gloria R. Leon, Personality and Behavioral Correlates of Obesity,
in PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF OttEsim A HANDBOOK 15, 22; Jordan W. Smoller et al., Popular
and Very-Low-Calorie Diets in the. Treatment of Obesity, in OBEsrry AND WEIGI l'1' CONTROL, 133, 133
(Revs Frankle & Mei -Uitt Yang eds., 1988).
25
 See 32 Million Overweight, Joint Committee Reports, 102 Puri. HEALTH REP. Ill, 111 (1087);
The Oprah Winfrey Show: Inside the Life of an Obese Person (Harp Productions, Inc., Feb. 7, 1994)
(transcript on file with the BOSTON Coia,EDE LAw REvaiw).
21 M.R.C. Greenwood & Virginia A. Pittman-Waller, Weight Control: A Complex, Various, and
Controversial Problem, in OBESITY AND WEIGHT CONTROL, 3, 10-11 (Reva 'E Frankle & Mei-Uils
Yang eds., 1988); Janet K. Grommet, Assessment of the Obese Person, in OitEsrry AND WEIGHT
CoNmot. I 1 1, 111 (Reva T. Frankle & Yang eds., 1988).
22 See generally Mervyn D. Willard, Obesity: Types and Treatments, 43 Am. FAM. PHYSICIAN 2099
(1991).
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substantiality stemming from low self-esteem." Environmental influ-
ences, such as a sedentary lifestyle or an unbalanced diet of fatty foods
and poor nutrition, may also contribute toward a propensity for obesity. 24
Recently, however, medical researchers studying obesity have be-
gun to reject previous notions that obesity is primarily a behavioral
disorder and, instead, have focused their research on the genetic links
to this disease.25 These researchers have concluded from genetic analy-
ses that a person's fat distribution is largely an inherited trait." A study
of identical twins reared apart showed that twins maintained a body
weight and fat distribution similar to their twin siblings regardless of
their environmental surroundings. 27 Additionally, a study of adopted
children revealed that children of biological parents of normal weight
who were placed in adoptive homes with obese family members did
not gain excessive weight. 28 Those conducting the above studies con-
cluded that genetics have an important role in the etiology of obesity,
and that the family environment alone has no apparent effect on one's
propensity for obesity.29
Regardless of its cause, obesity is a disease which has been associ-
ated with a variety of health risks and has been linked to a decrease in
longevity." The physical manifestation of obesity, excess weight, affects
many major bodily systems including the cardiovascular, musculoskele-
tal, metabolic, skin, respiratory and digestives' Obesity has also been
connected with an increased risk of specific health disorders such as
heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, gall bladder disease, arthritis and
cancer. 32 Moreover, studies reveal that individuals with a body weight
23 See id. at 2103-04.
21 See id. at 2100.
26 See Greenwood & Pittman-Waller, supra note 21, at 10.
26 1d. The authors state that "Mita from genetic analyses strongly indicate that distribution
of fat patterns may be inherited.. . . Thus, physiologic and genetic, as opposed to behavioral,
factors provide strong correlations in determining a person's body weight." Id. Additionally, they
conclude that "[riecognition of this concept is becoming increasingly important for under-
standing the etiology of obesity, and in determining approaches to rational treatments." Id.
27 See Albert J. Stunkard, et al., The Body-Mass Index of Twins Who Have Been Reared Apart,
322 N. ENnit.. J. MED. 1483, 1483 (1990).
28 See Alberti. Stunkard et al., An Adoption Study of Human Obesity, 314 N. ENGL. J. MED.
193, 193, 195 (1986).
29 See Stunkard, et al., The Body-Mass Index of Twins Who Have Been Reared Apart, supra note
27, at 1483; Stunkard et al., An Adoption Study of Human Obesity, supra note 28, at 193, 195.
"See Greenwood & Pittman-Waller, supra note 21, at 7; F.G.A.F. Hautvast & P. Deurenberg,
The Risks Associated With Obesity: Epidemiological Studies, in BODY WeicArr CONTROL 65, 65-68
(A.E. Bender & L.J. Brookes eds., 1987).
Hautvast & Deurenberg, supra note 30, at 67.
32 1d.
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20%-25% above their optimal levels are associated with an increased
mortality rate."
While treatment for obesity generally consists of a reduced intake
of calories to induce weight loss and a lifetime of weight maintenance,
the concepts of treatment and cure should not be confused." Dietary
treatment, the most common type prescribed, requires obese people
to alter their behavior by eating less than their weight-regulating sys-
tems are driving them to eat, and to maintain this state of semi-starva-
tion indefinitely to achieve weight loss. 3' Once weight loss is achieved,
however, the disease has not necessarily been cured."
Studies of the long-term effects of dieting show a low success rate
for maintained weight loss, thus, illustrating that weight loss is not a
cure for obesity." After losing weight, the obese person's system is likely
to convert a normal intake of calories into excess fat because the
metabolic dysfunction of the person's weight-regulating system per-
sists." Put another way, the regulatory system remains set at its prior,
inappropriate level, regardless of weight loss." Consequently, obese
" See Aviva Must et al., Long-term Morbidity and Mortality of Overweight Adolescents. : A Follow-
up of the Harvard Growth Study If 1922 to 1935, 327 NEW ENG, J. Men. 1350, 1350-55 (1992)
(obesity during adolescence was associated with increased mortality among men and reduced
functional status among women); Greenwood & Pittman-Waller, supra note 21, at 7 (authors cite
the 1979 Build Study to support conclusion that the obese have an increased mortality MC).
34 See Willard, supra note 22, at 2099; Carol J. Morton, Weight Loss Maintenance and Relapse
Prevention, in OBESITY AND WEIGHT Corrraol„ 315, 331 (Reva T. Frankle & Yang eds„
1988).
33 See Smollcr et al„ supra note 19, at 133; Willard, supra note 22, at 2099-100. The results
of prolonged semi-starvation may be more damaging than the condition of obesity itself. See C.
Wayne Callaway, Biologic Adaptations to Starvation and Semistarvation, in OBESITY AND WEIGHT
CONTROL, 97, 106-107 (Reva Frankle & Mei-Uih Yang eds., 1988). Semi-starvation predisposes
one to bingeing, and repeated dieting leads to greater difficulty in losing weight, a greater
efficiency in gaining weight, and a tendency to overeat once food becomes available. M Addi-
tionally, other costs of dietary treatment for obesity can include cold intolerance, hypertension,
constipation and other gastrointestinal dysfunctions, depression, fatigue and sleep disorders, Id,
" See Willard, supra note 22, at 2099; Morton, supra nole 34, at '331.
37 See IC. Cogan & E.U. Rothblum, Outcomes of Weight -loss Programs, 118 GENET. SOC. GEN.
PSYCHOL. MONOGR. 385, 385 (1992) (after examining results of fifty weight-loss studies conducted
in the 1980s, the authors argue that treating obesity through dieting techniques may be a
misdirected goal); Morton, supra note 34, at 331 (research has indicated that people may
experience weight gains during times of stress, and that motivation for weight control increases
or decreases in relation to major life events).
38 See Willard, supra note 22, at 2100 ("a low resting metabolic rate can be suspected when
a patient billows a calorie-controlled diet but still has difficulty preventing weight gain"); Lisa
Buckmaster & Kelly D. Brownell, Behavior Modification: The State of the Art, in OBESITY AND
WEIGHT CONTROL 225, 226 (Reva Frankle & Mei-Uilt Yang eds., 1988).
"See Backlit:ester & Brownell, supra note 38, at 226. Because the body interprets a diet as a
period of starvation, when the dieter goes off the diet, the body converts extra calories into fat
in anticipation of the next period of starvation. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION TO ADVANCE, FAT Ace P-
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individuals face an uphill battle in treating their disease, and they
must also endure harmful negative stereotypes perpetuated by a mis-
informed public. 40
B. Stereotypes and Discrimination Based on Obesity
Now that prejudice against most formerly stigmatized groups
has become unfashionable, if not illegal, one of the last ac-
ceptable forms of prejudice is that against obese persons. 4'
A majority of Americans regard obesity as a voluntary condition
arising from a lack of self-control and, consequently, resulting in a
variety of negative stereotypes of the obese. 42 Studies disclose that both
children and adults associate the obese with undesirable traits such as
laziness, a lack of discipline, a lack of intelligence and a lack of energy. 43
Such stereotypes result in discrimination and job bias against the
overweight, which in turn burdens society with a substantial social and
economic cost."
TANCE, DISPELLING COMMON MYTHS ABOUT FAT PEOPLE (unpublished pamphlet). Thus, yo-yo
dieting may lead to a "ratchet effect" resulting in a weight gain greater than the amount lost. Id.
For more information about NAAFA see supra note 6.
4° SeeBuckmaster & Brownell, supra note 38, at 226. In describing the difficulty an overweight
person faces in attempting to lose weight, one commentator succinctly explained that "[a]n obese
person going on a diet to overpower the set point fights a difficult battle, Numerous studies
show a remarkable tenacity in human physiology to maintain a fairly constant weight range and
a preordained amount of fat." Id. According to NAAFA, it may be healthier to maintain a high,
but stable, weight and to concentrate on personal fitness than to focus on weight loss, which often
leads to the harmful effects of yo-yo dieting. See DISPELLING COMMON MYTHS ABOUT FAT PEOPLE:,
Supra 110 te 39.
4I Albert Stunkard & Thorkild 1.A. Sorensen, Obesity and Socioeconomic Status — A Complex
Relation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1036, 1037 (1993).
42 See Gortmaker et al., supra note 5, at 1011; George L. Maddox et al., Overweight as Social
Deviance and Disability, 91 HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 287, 287 (1968); Natalie Allon, The Stigma
of Overweight in Everyday Lift, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF OBESITY: A HANDBOOK 130, 131
(Benjamin B. Wolman ed., 1982). In her February 7, 1994 show entitled Inside the Lift of an Obese
Person, Oprah Winfrey asked her audience members for their opinions of overweight people and
received the following stereotypical responses: "Most overweight people are just hiding behind
an excuse"; "I find it hard to look at overweight people and to understand what they're going
through [and] the way they feel. They need to take control of their lives ... [a] tid I think that
they can change [their conditions]"; -They usually take up way too much room on buses and
seats ... at concerts, anywhere. They're demanding all these rights now. And I don't think they
should have them . . . they have a choice. They don't have to be fat." The Oprah Winfrey Show:
Inside the Life of an Obese Person, supra note 20.
43 See Cynthia R. Jasper & Michael L. Klassen, Stereotypical Beliefs About Appearance: Implica-
tions for Retailing and C071511mer hsta,s, 71 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKI us 519, 522 (1990); Register
& Williams, supra note 5, at 131. •
44 See Gorunaker et al., supra note 5, at 1008-11 (obesity during adolescence has significant
social and economic consequences greater than those of many other chronic physical condi-
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Studies of grade school children reveal that discrimination against
the obese is deeply rooted in the American psyche.^ 5 In one study,
children were asked to rank pictures of children with various disabili-
ties. 46 The child with no disability was ranked first, and the trait of
obesity was consistently ranked last behind even physical dismember-
ment and facial disfigurement:17 The authors of this study concluded
that children were more concerned with disabilities affecting social
relationships than with those affecting , physical activities, and, there-
fore, that the obese child was the least socially desirable choice. 48
Similarly, a 1993 study conducted by Dr. Steven Gortmaker at the
Harvard School of Public Health illustrated the significant social and
economic consequences of obesity during aclolescence. 49 The study
tracked a sample of 10,039 randomly selected young Americans be-
tween the ages of sixteen and twenty-four over a seven year perfod. 50
The results showed that obese men and women were less likely to have
married, had completed fewer years of education and had lower house-
hold incomes than their peers of normal weight. 5 ' Because the study
accounted for a wide variety of known causes of lower socioeconomic
attainment, Dr. Gortmaker concluded that the results may best be
explained by discrimination based on the stigma of obesity. 52
dons); Register & Williams, supra note 5, at 139 (economic penalty resulting 111/111 obesity is more
severe 10 women than to men).
45 See Stephen A. Richardson et al., Cultural Uniformity in Reaction to Physical Disabilities, 26
Am. Soc. REV. 241, 242, 246 (1961); see also Erma J. Wright & Tony L. Whitehead, Perceptions of
Body Site and Obesity: A Selected Review of the Literature, 12 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 117, 120 (1987).
I" Richardson et al., supra note 45, at 242, 246.
47 See id. at 245.
4H See id.
Gortmaker, supra note 5, at 1009-11.
" Id. at 1008.
51 Id. at 1009-10. The effects of obesity were much more severe for women than for men.
Id. at 1010. Obese women were twenty percent less likely to be married, made $6,710 less per
year, completed fewer years of college and were tell percent more likely to live below the poverty
line than women who were not overweight. hi, While obese men were eleven percent less likely
to be married than men of normal weight, they were only marginally disadvantaged as compared
to their peers in the remaining areas, See id.
52 Id. at 1011. Additionally, the researchers found no socioeconomic. disparity between per-
sons with a variety of other chronic physical conditions and their peen without these chronic
conditions. Id. at 1009, 1011 (the chronic physical conditions included asthma, anomaly of the
spine, diabetes, arthritis, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, lower-limb anomalies, vision impairment, mus-
cular dystrophy and sickle cell anemia). Dr. Gortmaker reasoned that obesity differs from other
chronic conditions in its visibility, for which society holds the obese individual responsible. Id. at
1011. Although the researchers hypothesized that the stigma of obesity would promote low
self-esteem and would limit psychosocial development, which might help explain the negative
socioeconomic impact of obesity, they found no such effect. Id. Therefore, Dr. Gortmaker
concluded that there is a negative socioeconomic consequence of being overweight that is likely
the result of weight discrimination. Id. at 1012.
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Furthermore, surveys of obese workers reveal the harmful mani-
festation of stereotypes against the obese in the workplace." A 1987
National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance ("NAAFA") survey of
its obese members showed that forty percent of the obese men and
sixty percent of the obese women who responded had not been hired
for at least one job because of their weight. 54 Additionally, over thirty
percent of the obese men and women surveyed had been denied
promotions or raises and more than twenty-five percent had been
denied benefits because of their weight."
Likewise, another study surveying business people revealed that
executives in the highest wage group were seventy-five percent less
likely to be overweight than their lower paid colleagues. 56 The study
also showed that only nine percent of those executives in the highest
wage group were more than ten pounds overweight." Moreover, those
conducting the study concluded that each pound of fat was likely to
cost an executive $1,000 per year in salary. 58
Obesity studies illustrate the widespread existence and alarming
effect of weight discrimination.59 The obese are socially stigmatized
from early childhood and throughout their adult lives. 6° Additionally,
overweight workers are less likely to be hired, and if hired much less
likely to be promoted or even paid as well as their peers of normal
weight.'il Not surprisingly, victims of obesity discrimination have begun
seeking redress in court.62 The majority of such claims have arisen
under disability statutes that define disability expansively, and, in addi-
tion to protecting those who are actually disabled, protect groups that
are stigmatized by a perception of disability whether or not one truly
exists."
" See NAAFA Survey, supra note 6; see also Allon, supra note 42, at 139.
54 NAAFA Survey, .supra note 6 (the sample size of the survey consisted of 367 women and
78 men).
55 Id. (benefits that were denied included health and life insurance).
56 Allon, supra note 42, at 139 (citing the Robert Half Association survey of 1978).
57 Id.
riN
" See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text. For a discussion of earlier studies regarding
weight discrimination in employment see Jane Osborne Baker, Comment, The Rehabilitation Act
of 1973: Protection for Victims of Weight Discrimination?, 29 UCLA L. REV. 947, 952-55 (1982).
an
	
e.g., Gortmaker, supra note 5, at 1009-11; Wright & Whitehead, supra note 45, at 120.
61 See, e.g., Allon, supra note 42, at 139.
62 See, e.g., Tudynian v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 740-41 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Krein v.
Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 793-94 (N.D. 1987); Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-
Car Systems, Inc,, 594 A.2(1 264, 265 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); see generally, James C.
Frierson, Obesity as a Legal Disability Under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Stale Handicapped
Employment Laws, 44 LAB. LJ. 286 (1993).
65 See, e.g., Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of	 10 F.3d at 20 (claim made under Reha-
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11. STATUTORY DISABILITY LAW
A. The Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
It is the purpose of this [Act] 	 . to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities .. . . 64
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act") 66 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") protect the disabled
against employment discrimination.66 The Rehabilitation Act applies only
to federal departments and agencies, and to employers who hold federal
contracts or are recipients of federal financial assistance.° The ADA,
which became effective in July of 1992, protects the disabled from discrimi-
nation by private employers with fifteen or more employees, and by state
and local entities.° Both Acts define "disability" identically, and, there-
fore, the case law dealing with issues of disability under the Rehabili-
tation Act is valid precedent for similar cases arising under the ADA.°
The elements of a cause of action for disability discrimination are
delineated in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act [hereinafter § 504] ." To
prevail, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she applied for a position in a
federally funded program; (2) that she suffered from a cognizable
disability; (3) that in spite of her disability she remained "otherwise
qualified" for the position; and (4) that she was not accepted "due
solely to" her disability." The focus of this Note and the remainder of
this section is on the second element regarding the statutory definition
of disability.
bilitalion Act of 1973); Gimello, 594 A.2d at 265 (claim made tinder New Jersey state disability
statute).
64 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (b) (West 1993).
"The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1994) [hereinafter
"Rehabilitation Act"]. Congress amended the language of the Rehabilitation Act in 1992 to make
it consistent with that of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See id. Throughout this Note,
conditions covered by both of these statutes are referred to as "disabilities" except where quoting
materials which use the former term "handicap."
66 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1993)
[hereinafter "ADA"].
67 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a).
119 42 U.S.C.A. § 121 I 1 (5) (A).
re-' See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
70 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (a). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which has since been
codified as 29 U.S.C.A. § 794, states in relevant part that "[n]° otherwise qualified individual with
a disability... solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits or, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.. . ." Id.
71 See Cook, 10 E3d at 22; see also supra note 70 for the relevant statutory language. The term
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The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA break down the definition of
disability into three distinct categories that broadly describe the scope
of the term. 72
 First, an individual with a "physical or mental impair-
ment" that "substantially limits" one or more "major life activities" is a
disabled person under the Acts." Second, an individual with a "record"
of such an impairment satisfies the definition of disabled. 74 And third,
an individual who is "regarded" as having such an impairment,
whether or not one truly exists, is also within the statutory meaning of
disabled."
For an understanding of the breadth of the first prong of the
definition of disability, the terms "physical impairment," "substantially
limits," and "major life activities" require further explanation?'' Neither
Act, however, defines any of these terms. Therefore, it is necessary to
look at the relevant administrative guidelines for clarification of their
defi nitions. 77
The Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") has
enacted regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has enacted regu-
lations implementing the ADA—both of which interpret the above
terms. 78 Both have identical definitions for "physical impairment" and
"major life activities."78 Under the regulations, a "physical impairment"
is any physiological disorder or condition that affects a bodily system. 8°
of art "solely by reason of" is referred to as "due solely to" in this Note to be consistent with the
language used by the First Circuit in the Cook opinion.
72 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2). The Rehabilitation Act defines the
term 'disability" with respect to an individual as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has
a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." '29 U.S.C.A.
§ 706(8)(B). The ADA defines an "individual with a disability" as:
(A) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities ...
(8) A record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
73 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(8)(i); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (A).
74 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8) (B)(ii); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(B).
75 See 29 U.S.C.A, § 706(8) (B) (iii); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(C). This Note refers to the analysis
used under the "regarded" prong of the definition of disability as "perceived disability" analysis.
76 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8) (B) (i); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (A).
77 See 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1993).
7I5
	 id.
79 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.
8°.See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). The relevant language regarding the
meaning of "physical impairment" is: "Physical . . . impairment means . . . any physiological
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
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"Major life activities" include basic everyday functions such as caring
for one's self, walking, breathing, hearing and working!'
The EEOC regulations implementing the ADA similarly elucidate
the term "substantially limits."82 According to these regulations, an
individual is "substantially limit[ed]" if that individual is unable to
perform, or is significantly restricted in performing, a major life activity
that an average person can perform. 83 Additionally, the EEOC suggests
that the nature, severity, duration and long term impact of the impair-
ment may bear on the determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity. 84
Although the EEOC and HHS regulations provide guidance to
determine what constitutes a disability, they do not attempt to provide
an inclusive list of impairments that are disabilities. 85 Rather, these
administrative regulations, buttressed by judicial interpretations of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, have emphasized the expansive defini-
tion of disability inherent in federal disability law. 86 The HHS regula-
tions specifically decline to deliniate a list of specific diseases for fear
it would not be comprehensive. 87 Similarly, the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged that the Reahbilitation Act's definition encom-
f011owing body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hem le and lymphatic; skin;
and endocrine." 45 C.F.R. § 84.5(1)(2) (i); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). Additionally, in Appendix
A to the Health and Human Services ("1-11.1S") regulations, "Analysis of Final Regulation," HHS
expounds on its definition of impairment by stating that it includes "drug addiction and alcohol-
ism" and "any condition which is mental or physical but whose precise nature is not at present
known." 45 C.F.R. § 84, App. A, Subpart A(3). .
Si See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(i)(2)(0; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). The regulations define major life
activities as "ffinctions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." M.
82 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
88 See. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1). The relevant language of the regulation is as follows:
(i) Unable to perlbrin a major lile activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manlier or duration under which
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to . . . the
average person in the general population....
Id.
84 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2).
85 See 11-11-1S Analysis of Final Regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A, Subpart. A(3).
18i See M.; School Bd. of Nassau County. Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279-80 & n.5 (1987).
87 See 45 C.F.R. § H4 App. A, Subpart A(3). Regarding the definition of disability, HHS states
that "1t1 he definition does not set forth a list of specific diseases and conditions that constitute
physical or mental impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of
any such list." Id. Additionally, 1411S states that Idle] Department.... has no flexibility within
the statutory definition to limit the term to persons who have those severe, permanent, or
progressive conditions that are naist commonly regarded as handicaps." Id.
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passes a broad interpretation of disability, not limited to traditional
handicaps. 88
With respect to the second and third prongs of the definition of
disability, Congress made clear its intention for a broad interpreta-
tion." The Acts do not require individuals to actually be disabled."
Rather, individuals who are not disabled but have a record of being so
or are perceived as being so by their employers are also protected. 91
The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act sheds further light
on Congress's intent to protect those perceived as being disabled. 92 In
discussing the phrase "regarded as having a physical impairment," the
report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee states in
part that this definition applies to an individual with some kind of
visible physical impairment which in fact does not substantially limit
that individual's functioning." Additionally, the Senate Report states
that the third prong of the definition was intended to include those
persons discriminated against on the basis of disability, whether or not
they are in fact disabled, just as Title VI prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, whether or not the person discriminated against is
in fact a member of a racial minority."
Further guidance in interpreting the meaning of a perceived
disability is provided by the HHS regulations which delineate three
alternative explanations. 95 Under these regulations, an individual is
perceived as disabled if: she has an impairment that is not substantially
limiting but is treated as if it were; she has an impairment that is
substantially limiting but only as a result of the attitudes of others
toward such impairment; or she has no impairment but is treated as
having a substantially limiting one." Therefore, those persons who do
" Arline, 480 U.S. at 279-80 & n.5. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the 1.i1-i5 regu-
lations, which "were drafted with the oversight and approval of Congress," were "of significant
assistance" in "determining whether a particular individual is handicapped as defined by the
[Rehabilitation] Act" and endorsed the conclusion of the 1-11-1S that "a broad definition, one not
limited to so-called 'traditional handicaps,' is inherent in the statutory definition." See id.
99 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8) (B); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
90 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8) (B); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
91 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8) (B); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
92 See S. Rai'. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373,
6389-90.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 6389.
95 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j) (2)(iv).
96 See id. The relevant language of the regulation is as follows:
Is regarded as having an impairment means (A) has a physical or mental impairment
that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient
as constituting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impairment that
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not in fact have the condition which they are perceived as having, as
well as those persons whose mental or physical condition does not
substantially limit their life activities, are protected under federal dis-
ability law. 97
As a result of this broad definition of disability in the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the ADA, more impairments and conditions are being
accepted by the courts as disabilities." The expansion of the concept
of discrimination based on "perceived disabilities" has brought victims
of obesity discrimination to court for redress." So far, however, most
of the protection for victims of ebesity discrimination has not come
from federal law, but rather from state disability statutes.'"°
B. Stale Disability Statutes
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws
that prohibit employment discrimination against the disabled.m These
laws vary in the extent of their reach to private entities and in their
definitions of disability. 1 °2 The state disability laws fall into three cate-
gories: statutes broader in scope, narrower in scope, or statutes of a
similar scope as the federal laws. 1 °3
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others
toward such impairment; or (C) has none of the impairments defined in paragraph
(j)(2)(i) or this section but is treated by a recipient as having such an impairment.
Id.
97 See id.
"See, e.g.,Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 1 7.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989) (court held that applicant's
back condition may qualify as protected disability under Rehabilitation Act); Heron v. McGuire,
803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1986) (court held past drug addiction may be considered a disability
under Rehabilitation Act, but determined that plaintiff's current heroin addiction rendered him
unfit for police work); Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir.
1982) (court held that diabetes qualified as protected disability tinder Rehabilitation Act); see also
3A ARTHUR LARSON & Liilx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISGRIMINATIoN § 106.14(a) at 22-13 to
22-18 (1993).
99 See, e.g., Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Cal. 1993); Gimello v.
Agency Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 265 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1991); State Div. of
Human Rights ex rel. McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 695 (N.Y. 1985); see gowrally,
Frierson, supra note 62.
105 See, e.g., Gimello, 594 A.2d at 265; Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 695, 699; see also LA nsoN 8cl-AusoN,
supra note 98, §§ 107.30-107.32 at 22-118 to 22-131,
101 See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 98, § 107.31 at 22-118 n.1 for a complete listing of slate
statutes and the District of Columbia statute. Delaware is the only state that has not enacted a
disability statute. See id. at 22-118.
1 °2 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1, 10:5-5q (West 1993) (covering private entities and
defining disability arguably more broadly than the federal statutes) with ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-
14-301(b) (Michie 1991) (statute does not reach private employers) and UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 34-35-2(14), 34-35-6 (1988) (statute dues not include perceived disability provision).
"See, e.g., Mimi. STAT. ANN. § 3.548 (102)(1) (Callaghan 1990) (statute specifically includes
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The statutes of two jurisdictions, Michigan and the District of
Columbia, expressly provide broader protection than the federal dis-
ability laws. 1 "4 Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act prohibits dis-
crimination against all of the traditionally protected classes and, in
addition, includes the classes of height and weight. 145 Similarly, the
District of Columbia outlaws discrimination on the basis of personal
appearance. 106
The New York and New jersey disability laws are examples of state
laws that define disability differently than the federal laws and that
have been interpreted by courts more broadly than the federal laws.'"
Both states' statutory definitions of disability include conditions that
restrict the exercise of bodily functions or are demonstrable by medi-
cally accepted diagnostic techniques.'" Although these definitions are
not explicitly broader in scope than the federal ones, the courts of
these two states have on occasion found obesity to fit within their
respective staLuteS. 109
Conversely, some state disability laws are drafted more narrowly
than their federal counterparts."" The laws of Arkansas and Mississippi
do not reach private employers, and South Carolina's law gives a
constricted definition of disability."t Similarly, the definitions of dis-
weight as protected class); UTAH Coio ANN. §§ 34-35-2(14), 34-35-6 (1988) (statute does not
include perceived disability provision); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-87-1 (1993) (statute defers to federal
definitions in defining disability).
k01 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548 (102)(1) (Callaghan 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (a)
(1992).
1 °5 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548 (102)(1) (Callaghan 1990).
" See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a) (1992).
It)7 See. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4,1, 10:5-5q (West 1993); N.Y. Emit], Law §§ 292(21), 296
(McKinney 1993).
" See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4,1, 10:5-5q (West 1993); N.Y. Exec. LAw §§ 292 (21), 296
(McKinney 1993). The New Jersey statute defines Handicapped as "any ... psychological, physi-
ological or neurological condition which prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or mental
functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory
diagnostic techniques." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5q. Similarly, the New York statute defines disabil-
ity as "a physical[,] mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological or
neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstra-
ble by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. . . ." N.Y. ExEc. LAw
§§ 292(21).
1 °9 See Gimello, 594 A.2c1 at 265; Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 699.
to See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-14-301 (b) (Michie 1991) (statute does not reach private
employers); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-5-15 (1993) (statute does nut reach private employers); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 34-35-2(14), 34-35-6 (1988) (statute does not include perceived disability provi-
sion).
111 See Arm Cunt; ANN. § 20-14-301(b) (Michie 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (1993);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-33-60, 43-33-210 - (Law, Co-op. 1985). The South Carolina statute defines
handicapped as "any person who is visually impaired, legally blind, deaf or hearing-impaired, has
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ability in the laws of Utah and Virginia do not include perceived
disabilities."' Additionally, the Tennessee statute does not define the
term disability, thus leaving its scope open to interpretation." 3
The majority of state disability laws, however, are written in lan-
guage analogous to the federal statutes." 4 Therefore, cases arising
under these state disability laws provide persuasive authority in federal
disability cases.''5 In addition, because there is a dearth of federal case
law regarding weight discrimination, a review of the pertinent state
case law sheds light on the extent to which courts have been willing to
recognize obesity as a protected disability."'
III. DISABILITY CASE LAW PRIOR TO GOOK V..RHODE ISLAND,
DEPARTMENT OE MENTAL HEALTH, RETARDATION, AND HOSPITALS
A. State Case Law
A review of the weight discrimination cases arising under state
disability laws sheds light on the reasoning behind the arguments used
on both sides of this issue."' Courts that have rejected such state law
claims have done so primarily because of a lack of medical evidence
surrounding the plaintiff's condition." 8 In the few cases in which the
a disability of incixmlination or palsy resulting from brain, spinal or peripheral nerve damage,
has an amputation of tipper extremities, or is otherwise disabled in such a way as to interfere
with his ability to use written or visual material." S.C. Coot: ANN. § 43-33-210.
" 2 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(14), 34-35-6 (1988), 34-35-6 (Stipp. 1989); VA. Cone
ANN. 51.5-41 (Michie 1991).
H 3 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-50-103 (1993) (statute protects against employment discrimi-
nation based solely on physical, mental or visual handicap, but it does not define any of these
terms).
a detailed explanation of particular state laws see Frierson, supra note 62, at 290-92.
' ' 5 See, e.g., Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, 783
F, Stipp. 1569,1573 (RICA 1992) (citing to state law disability cases as authority).
See, e.g., Cassista, 856 P.2d at. 1144; Gimello, 594 A.2d at 265; Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 699;
Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793,793-94 (N.D. 1987).
' 17 Compare Cassista, 856 P.2d al 1144 (plaintiffs condition of obesity held not to constitute
disability under California law) with Gimello, 594 A.2d at 265 (obesity recognized as disability
under New Jersey law) and Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 699 (obesity recognized as disability under New
Yiirk law). For a review of stale disability case law in general, see Jane Massey Draper, Annotation,
What Constitutes Handicap Under State Legislation Forbidding Job Discrimination on Account of
Handicap, 82 A•-R.4th 26 (1990).
"See,	 Krein, 415 N.W.2d at 795-96 (court held that the existence of common ailments
resulting from obesity f•tiled to qualify obesity as a disability under North Dakota law); Underwood
v. Trans World Airlines, 710 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (because plaintiffs overweight
condition had no t been clinically diagnosed as an abnormal medical condition, court held it did
not constitute a disability under New York law).
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plaintiff has prevailed, however, the courts have concentrated on
whether the plaintiff was perceived as disabled because of her weight. 119
In 1987, in Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that obesity is not a disability under North
Dakota law unless accompanied by medically significant ailments.'" In
Krein, the plaintiff, terminated as a nurse's aid by the defendant nurs-
ing home, claimed employment discrimination on the basis of her
obesity. 12 ' The North Dakota law, however, did not contain a "perceived
disability" provision and did not define disability.'" The Krein court,
relying on a WEBsTER's dictionary definition of disability,'" rejected
the plaintiff's claim because she failed to demonstrate that her weight
physically incapacitated her.' 24
 The court did concede, however, that
the state law may comprehend an obese condition that significantly
impairs a person's abilities.' 25
Additionally, in the 1981 case of Greene v. Union Pacific Railroad,
a federal district court applying Washington state law held that, be-
cause obesity is a mutable condition, it cannot be considered a disabil-
ity.' 21" In this case, the plaintiff was morbidly obese and worked for the
defendant railroad.' 27
 Upon rejection of his request to transfer to the
defendant's fire department, the plaintiff filed suit claiming disability
discrimination.' 28
 The Greene court concluded that the plaintiff was not
disabled because his weight varied and, thus, was not an immutable
condition such as blindness or lameness.'" Recent decisions, however,
have found this reasoning unconvincing. 130
119 See, e.g., Gimello, 594 A.2d at 272-73.
120 See 415 N.W.2d at 795-96.
121 Id, at 793-94.
122 See id. at 795. The court cited to the then existing North Dakota law, N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-02.4-0 I and 14-02.4-03, that stated in relevant part: "It is the policy of this state to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of ... the presence of any mental or physical disability," and "lilt is
a discriminatory practice for an employer ... to discharge an employee ,
	 because of .
physical or mental handicap... ." Id.
129 Id. at 796 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL. DICTIONARY (1971) as follows:
"a physical or mental illness, injury or condition that hinders, impedes or incapacitates").
12' 1 See id.
125
	 415 N.W.2d at 796.
126 548 F. Stipp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
127 Id. at 4-5.
12" See id. at 5. The defendant's purported reason for rejecting the plaintiff's request was
plaintiff's failure to meet the height and weight specifications for defendant's firefighting posi-
tion. See id.
129 Id. Alternatively, the court held that, even if obesity was a disability, the plaintiff was not
"otherwise qualified" for a firefighting position because the defendant's height and weight
requirements were a "bona fide occupational qualification." Id.
1119
 See, e.g., Gimello, 594 A.2d at 265, 273; Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 698-99.
July 1994]	 OBESITY DISCRIMINATION	 943
For example, in 1985, in State Division of Human Rights ex rel.
McDermott v. Xerox Corp., New York's highest court held that obesity
may constitute a disability under New York law whether or not it is an
immutable condition.'" In McDermott, the plaintiff, a computer pro-
grammer, applied for a job with Xerox but failed a preemployment
medical examination because she was obese." 2 Xerox failed to explain
why plaintiff's weight would interfere with the position in question,
and plaintiff established that her weight had not affected her ability to
perform similar jobs in the past.'" In rejecting defendant's argument
that the statute should only apply to disabilities that are immutable,
the court concluded that New York state law protects all persons with
disabilities and not just those with hopeless conditions.'"
Similarly, in the 1991 case of Gimello v. Agency Rent-A - Car Systems,
Inc., the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey sus-
tained plaintiff's claim of obesity discrimination under both an actual
and perceived disability analysis.'" In Gimello, the plaintiff claimed that
he was fired from his position as office manager of a car rental agency
because of his obesity, and not because of the performance-related
problems as the defendant claimed.'" The court recognized the plain-
tiff's obesity as a medical condition for which he had sought treatment
and, therefore, concluded that it constituted an actual disability under
the New Jersey law.'" Additionally, the Gimello court concluded that
the plaintiff was fired because his supervisors perceived his obesity as
a defect when in fact it did not disqualify him in any proven sense from
his present job or career path. 138
131 480 N.E.2d 695, 698-99 (N.Y 1985). The court described the relevant language of the
then existing New York statute as follows: "the term 'disability' means a physical, menud or
medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions [which]
prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques...." Id. at 696,
132 Id. at 695-696 (plaintiff stood five feet, six inches tall and weighed 249 pounds).
133 See id. at 696.
134 Id. at 698. The court went on to emphasize that "nothing in the statute or its legislative
history 'mileages] a legislative intent to permit employers to manse to hire persons who are able
to do the job simply because they have a possibly treatable condition of excessive weight." Id. at
699.
135 See 594 A.2d 264, 273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
136 Id. at 265. Plaintiff produced memoranda praising his job performance and was able to
show that, when he became subject to the supervision of a new manager, problems arose
regarding his body weight. Id. at 266-68.
137 Id. at 273. The relevant. New Jersey statute relied on by the court defined "handicap" as:
"suffering ... from any mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from anatomi-
cal, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which ... is demonstrable, medically
or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id. at 274 (citing
NJ. S'rA'r. ANN. § 10:5-5q).
138 1d. at 273.
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Finally, in the most recent state court case to address the issue of
obesity as a disability, Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., the California
Supreme Court reversed the decision by the California Court of Appeal
and held that obesity as a voluntary condition is not a disability under
California law.' 39 The plaintiff in Cassista, who was five feet four inches
tall and weighed 305 pounds, applied for an available position in a
health food store, and was rejected after an interview by the defendant,
Community Foods.' 4° Claiming employment discrimination on the ba-
sis of her weight, the plaintiff sued under the California Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Act which defines disability in a similar manner as
the federal laws. 14 I
The California Court of Appeal sustained Cassista's discrimination
claim, holding that the defendant rejected Cassista because it per-
ceived her as disabled."' The appellate court concluded that Commu-
nity Food's admission that it believed that plaintiff would not be able
to keep up with the pace of work established that it regarded her as
limited in major life activities and, thus, disabled."' Additionally, the
court determined that the defendant's rejection of Cassista was based
upon stereotypical beliefs about the abilities of overweight people and
that it was precisely the type of conduct the state law was enacted to
prevent."'"
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California disagreed and deter-
mined that when obesity is a voluntary condition it does not fall within
the scope of the California law. 145 In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the
California Supreme Court held that, to qualify as either an actual or
perceived disability under California law, obesity must result from a
physiological disorder." 6 The Cassista court, however, relied on a por-
tion of the federal district court opinion in Cook v. Rhode Island,
Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals regarding mu-
139 See 856 13.2d 1143, 1152-53, 1154 (Cal. 1993) (the court concluded that obesity insist be
the result of a physiological disorder even to qualify as a perceived disability) [hereinafter Cassista
II]. For a similar analysis of obesity as a disability under state law see Civil Serv. COMM . 11 of
Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled the state appellate court which had found
plaintiff's obesity to constitute a perceived disability. See id. at 284.
14° Cassista v. Community Foods, 10 Cal, Rptr. 2d 98, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)[hereinafter
Cassista I],
141 See id. at 101, 102, 103-105.
142 Cassista 1,10 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
145 a
144 Id. at 110.
145
 See Catsisla II, 856 P.2d at 1152, 1154.
1411 Id. at 1153-54. Additionally, the physiological disorder must affect one or more of the
bodily systems and limit a major life activity, or be perceived as limiting one. Id. at 1153.
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table and voluntary conditions that was subsequently overturned by the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit."'
The state law disability cases show a split in the reasoning used by
courts in analyzing obesity as a protected disability."' Courts that focus
on the medical aspects of the disease tend to view obesity as a voluntary
condition and are reluctant to classify it as a disability.'" Alternatively,
courts that have expanded the term disability beyond immutable con-
ditions have found obesity to qualify as both an actual and perceived
disability under state law.' 5° Prior to the Cook case, however, no court
had found obesity to constitute a disability under federal law.' 51
B. Federal Case Law
The federal disability case law prior to the First Circuit's decision
in Gook dealt primarily with conditions other than obesity. 152 For exam-
ple, in 1987, the United States Supreme Court recognized tuberculosis
as a protected disability and indicated that the federal definition of
disability is an expansive one. 15" Additionally, several federal appellate
and district courts have extended the reach of the Rehabilitation Act
to various other impairments. 154 Of the few courts that have directly
addressed the disease of obesity, however, none has found it to be a
federally protected disability:"
147 See id, at 1152; see also Cook, 10 17.3d at 23-24 & n.7.
148 See supra notes 117-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of relevant state case law.
149 See, e.g., Greene, 548 F. Supp, at 5 (obesity held not to be within Washington disability
discrimination laws due to its arguably mutable nature), For a discussion of this case see supra
notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
15
° See, e.g., Gimello, 594 A.2d at 273. For a discussion of this case see supra notes 135-138
and accompanying text.
151 see, e.g., Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F Supp. 739, 746 (Cl).. 	 Cal. 1984) (federal
district court rejected plaintiff's claim that his excessive weight constituted a disability under
Rehabilitation Act).
152 See, e.g., Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989) (court held that appli-
cant's back condition may qualify as protected disability under Rehabilitation Act); Heron v.
McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1986) (court held past drug addiction may be considered
disability under Rehabilitation Act, but determined that plaintiffs current heroin addiction
rendered him unfit. for police work); 13entivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619,
623 (9th Cir. 1982) (court held that diabetes qualified as protected disability under Rehabilitation
Act); see also LARSON & LARSON, supra note 98, § 106.14(a) at 22-13 to 22-18,
I" See School Bd. of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278-280 & n.5, 284-285,
289 (1987).
151 See supra note 152 for a description of three cases holding variims impairments M
constitute statutory disabilities.
I" See, e.g., Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746 (federal district court rejected plaintiff's claim that
his excessive weight constituted disability under the Rehabilitation Act).
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In the 1987 case of School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline,
the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act's
definition of disability and determined that the contagious disease of
tuberculosis fell within the scope of the Act.' 58 In reaching its holding,
the Court endorsed the HHS regulations, which it emphasized were
drafted with the oversight and approval of Congress.'" Additionally,
the Court noted that a broad interpretation of disability, rather than
one limited to traditional handicaps, was inherent in the statutory
definition.' 58
In Arline, the plaintiff sued the defendant school board for em-
ployment discrimination after being fired from her teaching job due
to her tuberculosis.' 59 The Supreme Court held that a person suffering
from a contagious disease can be considered a disabled person under
the Rehabilitation Act, and concluded that the plaintiff here was such
a person. 16°In determining that tuberculosis was a cognizable disability,
the Arline Court emphasized that society's accumulated myths and
fears about disease are as debilitating as the physical limitations that
flow from actual impairment.'''
Similarly, several federal appellate and district court decisions
have extended the reach of the Rehabilitation Act to a variety of
non-traditional disabilities.'" These courts have found alcoholism, al-
lergies, back problems, cancer, cerebral palsy, diabetes, drug addiction,
epilepsy, heart disease and multiple sclerosis to constitute disabilities
under the Rehabilitation Act.'" In contrast, although a few district
courts had considered the issue prior to the Cook case, none had
recognized obesity as a federally protected disability.'"
For example, in the 1984 case of Tudyman v. United Airlines, the
United States District Court for the Central District of California re-
jected plaintiff's argument that his excessive weight constituted a disc
156 480 U.S. at 289.
157
 See id. at 279.
158 See id. at 278-80 Sc n.5.
159
 Id. at 276.
III° Id. at 289. The Court, however, remanded the case for a determination of whether the
plaintiff was otherwise qualified for her position. M
tat Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
161t See, e.g., Thornhill, 866 F.2d at 1184 (court held that applicant's back condition may qualify
as a protected disability under Rehabilitation Act); Heron, 803 F.2d at 68-69 (court held past drug
addiction may be considered disability under Rehabilitation Act, but determined that plaintiff's
current heroin addiction rendered him unfit for police work); Rentivegna, 694 F.2d at 623 (court
held that diabetes qualified as protected disability under Rehabilitation Act); see also Lsotson
1.,nasoN, supra note 98, § 106.14(a) at 22-13 to 22-18.
153 See supra note 162.
161
 See Cook, 10 F.3d at 20, 22 (court describes case as 4pathbreaking 'perceived disability'
case").
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ability under the Rehabilitation Act)' The plaintiff in Tudyman, an
avid bodybuilder, brought suit after being rejected as a flight attendant
by the defendant airline because he failed to meet specified weight
guidelines.th6 Because the plaintiff voluntarily chose to maintain his
weight above the airline's standard, the court held for the defendant. 167
The Tudyman court reasoned that the Rehabilitation Act did not pro-
tect the plaintiff's right to be both a bodybuilder and a flight atten-
dant.' 68
Similarly, the issue of obesity as a § 504 disability arose in the 1986
case of Russell v. Salve Regina College but was never reached by the
court.m The plaintiff in Russell claimed that her expulsion from de-
fendant's nursing program was the result of obesity discrimination,
and, in the alternative, that the defendant had breached its contract
with her.'" The United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island dismissed plaintiff's § 504 claim because of her failure to show
that the defendant was the recipient of federal funds.' 7 ' In discussing
the breach of contract claim, however, the Russell court made known
its aversion to weight discrimination.'" The court questioned whether
Russell's weight was a legitimate impediment to completing the nurs-
ing program or whether the College's evaluation was tainted by an
unreasonable aversion to obesity.' 73
In sum, the federal appellate and district courts have followed the
Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of disability in Arline and
have extended the Rehabilitation Act's protection to several non-tradi-
tional disabilities.' 74 Prior to the Cook case, however, no court had
1 °5 608 F. Stipp. 739,746 (D.C. Cal. 1984).
111°M. at 740-41.
167 Id. at 746. The plaintiff, although overweight, had excessive muscle tissue and a relatively
small amount of fat tissue, and thus was not obese in the medical sense. See id. at 741.
L68 1d. at 746.
167 See 649 F. Supp. 391,395-396,398 (D.R.l. 1986), affil, 890 F.2d 484 (lst Cir. 1989), reu'd
on other grounds, 499 U.S. 225 (1991) (Court reversed regarding separate issue of whether
questions of state law are reviewable un appeal de novo).
170 Id. at 395-96 (plaintiff made a total of eight separate claims).
171 Id. at 397-98.
172 See id. at 406.
173 Id. at 406. The court stated that:
A genuine question exists as to whether adiposis was, in Russell's case, a legitimate
impediment to due fulfillment of the clinical requirements of the nursing program
(as Salve maintains), or whether the College's evaluation was tainted by an unrea-
sonable aversion to obesity or by a desire to expel Russell because she did not
conform to the "Salve image."
174 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text for a description of various conditions
which have satisfied the definition of disability.
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recognized obesity as a federally protected disability.'" It was in view
of this body of existing law that the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit heard Bonnie Cook's case.
IV. THE COOK V. RHODE ISLAND, DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL
HEALTH, RETARDATION, AND HOSPITALS DECISION
On November 22, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, in Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health,
Retardation, and Hospitals, became the first federal appellate court to
hold that an individual's obesity may be included within the Rehabili-
tation Act's definition of disability.'" The plaintiff in the case, Bonnie
Cook, who was five foot three and weighed over 300 pounds, claimed
disability discrimination against the defendant for its refusal to hire
her because of her weight.' 77 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
upheld the district court's order granting the plaintiff equitable relief
and endorsing a jury's verdict, which recognized Ms. Cook's morbid
obesity as a statutory disability and granted her compensatory dam-
ages.'" Additionally, the Court of Appeals rejected the reasoning of the
disctrict court in an earlier opinion that obesity can only be a disability
when it is an immutable or involuntary condition.'" In reaching its
holding, the First Circuit reasoned that employment discrimination
based on negative stereotypes about overweight people is the type of
behavior that federal disability laws were enacted to prevent."°
In November 1988, Bonnie Cook applied for an available position
as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded ("IA-MR") at the
Ladd Center, a residential facility for retarded persons operated by
Rhode Island's Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hos-
pitals ("MHRH") . 18 ' Ms. Cook had previously worked at the Ladd Cen-
ter as an IA-MR from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986, leaving, on
both occasions, voluntarily and with a spotless performance record.' 82
175 See supra notes 165-173 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal case law
rejecting claims concerning obesity as a disability.
128 See Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of MHRH, 10 F.3d 17, 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1993) (hereinafter
Cook II]. The court limited its holding to the facts of the case, which concerned the plain tifrs
morbid obesity. Id. at 28.
177 See id. at 20-21.
178 See id. at 21, 28 (upholding jury award of $100,000 in damages to Ms. Cook, and equitable
relief of appointment to position for which she had applied).
1711
 See id. at 23-25 & n.7 (rejecting reasoning in district court's opinion denying defendant's
motion to dismiss).
18° See id. at 27.
181 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, Cook II, 10 F.3d 17 (No. 93-1093).
182 Cook 11,10 F.3d at 20.
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During a pre-employment physical, a nurse determined that, although
Ms. Cook, at five foot three inches and over 300 pounds, was morbidly
obese, she was not limited in any manner in her ability to perform the
duties of an IA-MR.'" MHRH, however, relying on the opinion of the
Ladd Center's Dr. O'Brien, refused to hire Bonnie Cook because of
her morbid obesity. 18 4 MHRH endorsed Dr. O'Brien's conclusion that
Ms. Cook's condition would limit her ability to safely evacuate patients
in the case of an emergency, and would result in an increase in absen-
teeism and workers' compensation claims. 18'
As a result, in November 1990, Bonnie Cook brought suit against
defendant MHRH in the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island, claiming disability discrimination under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and analogous state laws.'" Ms. Cook claimed that
MHRH unlawfully rejected her application for employment on the
basis of her morbid obesity.' 87 In response, MHRH filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, claiming that plaintiff's suit was time-barred and
asserting that morbid obesity is not a disability within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act.'"
A. The District Court Opinion Denying Defendant MHRH's
Motion to Dismiss
In its 1992 opinion denying defendant's Rule 12(b) (6) motion to
dismiss, the district court concluded that Ms. Cook's claim was timely,
and that Ms. Cook could possibly prove that her obesity was a physical
impairment or that MHRH perceived it to be a physical impairment
as required under the Rehabilitation Act.'" In dismissing MHRH's
claim of untimeliness, the court explained that the statute of limita-
tions under § 504 is that applied by the state to its most analogous type
of cause of action. 1J° Here, Bonnie Cook was well within the three years
183 See iel. at 20-21.
184 See id. at 21, 28 & n.13.
185 See id.
186 1%rief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 1-2, Cook II, 10 F.3d 17 (No. 93-1093). Plaintiff invoked
pendent. jurisdiction of the federal district court for her analogous state law claims arising under
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-87-1. Id. at 1. Because of the similarity between the federal and state claims,
the courts focused their attention on the federal claim arising under the Rehabilitation Act. See
Cook 11,10 F.3d at 21 11.2.
1 " See Cook v. Rhode Island, Dept of MFIRH, 783 F. Supp. 1569, 1570-71 (D.R.I. 1992)
(hereinafter Cook
188 See id. at 1571.
189 Cook 1, 783 F. Supp. at 1572, 1573-74, 1576.
19° Id. at 1572.
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allowed for state personal injury claims in Rhode Island. 19 ' Regarding
the issue of obesity as a disability, the court noted that neither the
legislative history nor the text of the statute provided any guidance
and, therefore, focused its attention on the regulations promulgated
by the HHS. 192
Because the HHS regulations do not specifically refer to obesity,
the district court reasoned that in order for obesity to be considered
an actual disability it must be shown to be a physiological disorder
affecting one of the bodily systems enumerated in the regulations.'"
The court, citing both Tudyman and Greene, stated that Ms. Cook would
have to establish that her morbid obesity resulted from an immutable
medical condition that she was powerless to control.' 94 Additionally, the
court explained that under the HHS regulations the plaintiff would
have to establish that her condition substantially limited one or more
major life activities, such as her ability to work.'" In rejecting defen-
dant's motion, the court concluded that the issues surrounding obesity
as a cognizable disability could not be decided from the limited record
before it. 196
Finally, the district court acknowledged that Ms. Cook could pre-
vail on a perceived disability argument even if the complaint indicated
that she was not actually disabled. 197 The court emphasized that the
language "regarded as having such an impairment" extended the
reach of the Rehabilitation Act to individuals with some kind of visible
physical condition which either does not substantially limit their func-
tioning, or limits their functioning only because of the negative reac-
tions of others to their condition.'" Because MHRH refused to hire
191 Id. The court assumed that R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14, governing actions for personal
injury, was most analogous. Id. Defendant erroneously argued that the thirty day statute of
limitations following denial by the EEOC in Title VII cases applied. Id. at 1571.
192 See id. at 1572-73. The court found the HI-IS regulations to be particularly relevant
because it was through this agency that the Ladd Center received federal funding, thus, placing
it within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 1573.
193 1d. at 1573. The following bodily systems arc enumerated in the relevant regulation:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardio-
vascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; heroic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine. 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (A); see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
HHS regulations defining "physical impairment" and "major life activities."
194 Cook I, 783 F. Supp. at 1573.
195 Id. at 1574. For a discussion of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") regulation defining "substantially limits," 29 § 1630.2(j), see supra notes 82-84
and accompanying text.
1911
 See Cook I, 783 F. Supp. at 1574.
197 /d.
198 Id. at 1575 (quoting S. Rio'. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6414; and Arline, 480 U.S. at 283).
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Cook solely because of her obesity, the court concluded that, if Ms.
Cook could demonstrate that MHRH perceived obesity as a disability
and that she was otherwise qualified for the IA-MR position, she would
be successful in proving her claim.' 9°
Bonnie Cook's case was tried before a jury in September 1992. 200
Defendant, MHRH, moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close
of testimony."' The court reserved judgment and submitted the case
to the jury on three interrogatories to which defendant made no
objection.202 The jury decided in favor of Ms. Cook and awarded her
$100,000 in compensatory damages. 203 Additionally, the court denied
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and granted
plaintiff equitable relief, ordering her appointment to the IA-MR po-
sition with retroactive seniority. 204 Subsequently, MHRH filed a timely
appeal from the final judgment of the district court. 205
B. The _First Circuit's Opinion
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
the district court's order and held that Ms. Cook's morbid obesity was
a federally protected disability. 2°6 In reaching its holding, the First
Circuit rejected the reasoning endorsed by the district court in the
earlier Cook opinion, and advanced by the defendant, that a physical
impairment must be immutable to qualify under § 504 as a disability. 207
Additionally, the court discounted the defendant's arguments that its
rejection of the plaintiff for a single position did not violate the statute,
and in the alternative that Ms. Cook was not otherwise qualified for
the IA-MR position.208
199 See id. at 1576. MFIR1.1 offered an additional argument that it had made a reasonable
accommodation by agreeing to hire Ms. Cook if she reduced her weight to 300 pounds or less.
Id. The court swiftly rejected this argument slating that: "there is no indication that MIMI made
any such modification to accommodate Cook's obesity. Rather what it did was require Cook to
reduce or eliminate her alleged handicap in order to be hired." See id.
mlBrief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, Cook II, 10 F.3d 17 (No. 93-1093).
201 Cook II, 10 E3c1 at 21.
202 1d.
203 Id. The jury found that Ms. Cook, apart from her morbid obesity, was qualified to perform
the duties of an institution attendant for the mentally retarded ("IA-MR"), and that defendant
did not reasonably believe that Ms. Cook lacked such qualifications. Id. at 21 n,3.
204
	
of Plaintiff-Appellee at 3, Cook II, 10 F.3d 17 (No. 93-1093); see also Cook, 10 F.3c1 at
21.
205 Cook II, 10 F.3d at 21.
206 See id. at 28.
207 See id. at 23-24 &n.7,
208 1d. at 25-28; see also Brief of Defendant, Appellant at 18-28, Cook, 10 F.3d 17 (No.
93-1093).
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The First Circuit structured its analysis around the four elements
of a § 504 failure to hire cause of action. 209
 Initially, the court addressed
the first element requiring that the defendant employer be a recipient
of federal funding. 21 ° Because MHRH conceded that the Ladd Center
obtained substantial funding from the HHS, the First Circuit con-
cluded that the plaintiff had satisfied the first element of her claim. 2"
Next, the Cook court addressed the second element of the plain-
tiffs claim regarding morbid obesity as a cognizable disability. 212 Be-
cause Ms. Cook pursued her claim solely under the "regarded" as
having a disability prong of the statute, the court limited its opinion
to a perceived disability analysis. 213 The court referred to the HHS
regulations that define a perceived disability as a "physical impairment"
that does not "substantially limit" a "major life activity" but is treated
as if it does, or the perception of a substantially limiting impairment
when no actual impairment exists. 2 t 4
In analyzing the second element, the First Circuit initially deter-
mined that Ms. Cook's morbid obesity could reasonably be considered
a "physical impairment." 215 The court reasoned' that the expert testi-
mony that morbid obesity resulted from metabolic and appetite sup-
pression dysfunctions, and that it adversely affected the musculoskele-
2(J See Cook 11, 10 F.3d at 22. To prevail on a disability discrimination claim under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act [hereinafter § 504], the plaintiff has the burden of proving: (1)
that she applied for a position in a federally funded program; (2) that she suffered from a
cognizable disability; (3) that in spite of her disability she remained otherwise qualified for the
position; and (4) that she was not accepted due solely to her disability. See see supra notes
70-71 and accompanying text for an explanation of these elements.
210 Cook II, 10 F.3d at 22.
211 See id.
212 cook II, 10 F.3d at 22. The First Circuit structured its analysis by examining in sequence
the terms "physical impairment," "substantially limits," and "major life activities" as they related
to Ms. Cook's condition. See id; see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B). See supra notes 72-84 and
accompanying text for an explanation of the statutory meaning of each of these terms.
213 See Cook II, 10 F.3d at 22-23; see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8) (b). See supra notes 89-97 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the perceived disability prong of the statutory definition of
disability.
211
	 II, 10 F.3d at 22-23. The relevant language from the 11145 regulations is as follows:
his regarded as having an impairment. means (A) has a physical ... impairment
that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated .. as
constituting such a limitation; . . or (C) has none of the impairments ... of this
section but is treated ... as having such an impairment.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2)(iv)(1993). See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the above HHS regulations.
215 Cook II, 10 F.3d at 23. Physical impairment is defined in the EMS regulations as "any
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological; tnusculoskeletal; special sense organs; respira-
tory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hetnic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.. . ." 45 § 84.3(j) (2)(i) (A)(1993). See supra notes 72-80
and accompanying text for further explanation of this statutory term.
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tal, respiratory and cardiovascular systems, qualified Ms. Cook's condition
as a physical impairment:2 ' 6 Alternatively, the court emphasized that
§ 504's perceived disability prong may he satisfied whether or not the
plaintiff actually has a physical impairment. 217
The First Circuit determined that even if Ms. Cook's obesity was
not a physical impairment, MHRH treated it as one:218 The court
reasoned that Dr. O'Brien's statement that morbid obesity affects "vir-
tually every [body] system" supported a finding that defendant re-
garded Ms. Cook's condition as a physical impairment:2 ' 9 The Cook
court continued its analysis by addressing the defendant's two argu-
ments opposing this conclusion. 220
The First Circuit rejected defendant's first argument that mutable
conditions arc per se precluded from the statutory definition of physi-
cal impairment.22 ' The court reasoned that because no mention of
mutability is made within the statute or regulations, it is not a necessary
requirement. 222 Rather, the court determined that mutability should
only be considered as to the substantiality of the physical impair-
ment.223
Moreover, the court cautioned the defendant about confusing the
treatment used for obesity with its cure."' Although it acknowledged
that perennial undereating may result in weight loss, the First Circuit
found that plaintiff's morbid obesity was likely not curable because of
the permanent nature of a dysfunctional metabolism. 225 Finally, the
court held that, even if immutability were a requirement, under the
perceived disability doctrine, an employer's perception that the impair-
ment was immutable would suffice. 22"
Similarly, the First Circuit dismissed defendant's second argument
that morbid obesity resulting from voluntary conduct cannot be con-
sidered a physical impairment. 227 For support, the Cook court relied on
prior cases in which other supposed "voluntary" conditions had been
216 Cook 11, 10 1 1'.3t1 at 23.
217
 Id, at 22.
218 1(1. at 23.
219 Id. at 23 & 0.6.
2" See id. at 23.
221 See Cook 11, 1 0 F.3d at 23-24 & n.7.
222 Cook 1410 F.3d at 23 n.7, The Court stated that "imiutability is nowhere mentioned in
the statute or regulations, and we see little reason to postulate it as an automatic disqualifier
under section 504." hi.
229 Id. at 23 n.7, 24.
224 See id, at 24.
225 See id .
226Id ,
227 Cook II, 10 F.3d at 24.
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held to constitute physical impairments under § 504. 228 Emphasizing
the absence of any statutory language regarding voluntariness, the
court reasoned that the manner in which an individual became im-
paired is of little consequence. 229 Additionally, the court reiterated that
the ample medical testimony in the record suggested that Ms. Cook's
morbid obesity was a physiologically-based condition, not a voluntary
condition. 2"
The Cook court continued its analysis of obesity as a cognizable
disability by examining whether MHRH regarded plaintiff's condition
as "substantially limiting" one or more of her "major life activities." 281
Looking first to define "major life activities," the court referred to the
HHS regulations which define the term as basic everyday functions
including caring for one's self, performing manual tasks and work-
ing.282 The court found that Dr. O'Brien's testimony that he believed
that Ms. Cook's morbid obesity would interfere with her ability to walk,
lift, bend, stoop and kneel was reason enough for the jury to properly
conclude that MHRH viewed plaintiff's suspected impairment as im-
peding her major life activities. 2"
In concluding its analysis of the second element of the plaintiff's
claim, the First Circuit held that the defendant treated Ms. Cook as if
her morbid obesity "substantially limited" a major life activity. 284 Unable
to find guidance within the Rehabilitation Act, the court endorsed the
definition of "substantially limits" provided in the EEOC regulations
implementing the ADA. 235 The First Circuit determined that Dr. O'Brien's
admission that he believed plaintiff's obesity foreclosed a broad range
of employment options in the health care industry was sufficient to
resolve this issue. 236 It held that a jury could reasonably have inferred
229 See id. The court noted the following conditions to which 'the Act indisputably applies
... [and] that may be caused or exacerbated by voluntary conduct such as alcoholism, AIDS,
diabetes, cancer resulting from cigarette smoking, heart disease resulting from excesses of various
types, and the like." Id.
229 See id. (voluntariness is only relevant in regards to the substantiality of the impairment).
239 Id. at 24.
231 Id. at 25.
292 See Cook 11,10 F.3d at 25. The relevant language is as follows; "[m)ajor life activities means
functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j) (2)(ii) (1993). See supra notes
78-8I fur further discussion of the statutory meaning of 'major life activities."
299 Cook 11, 10 F.3(1 at 25.
234
	 id.
255 See id. at 25 n.10. The EEOC regulations suggest that the nature, severity, duration, and
long term impact of the impairment be taken into account when determining whether or not
an impairment is a substantially limiting one. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2). See supra notes 82-84
and accompanying text for further explanation of "substantially limits."
296 Cook II, 10 F.3d at 25.
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from this statement alone that defendant regarded plaintiff's condition
as substantially limiting her ability to work, a major life activity."'
Moreover, the court dismissed defendant's argument that a single
rejection for employment cannot constitute substantially limiting a
plaintiff's ability to work."8 The Cook court reasoned that a require-
ment of multiple rejections would promote the performance of futile
acts contrary to sound principles of law."" Accordingly, the First Circuit
held that the rejection of an applicant for a single job that requires no
unique physical skills can constitute treating an applicant as if her con-
dition substantially limited a major life activity—the ability to work. 24°
Therefore, because Ms. Cook had satisfied each part of the second
element of her claim, the court concluded that her morbid obesity was
a protected disability within the Rehabilitation Act."'
The Cook court next examined the third element of plaintiff's
cause of action concluding that Ms. Cook was "otherwise qualified" for
the IA-MR position. 242 Because MHRH did not make specific inquiries
into Ms. Cook's capabilities but relied, instead, on generalizations
about the obese, the First Circuit questioned whether it had even
presented evidence sufficient to raise a factual question. 243 Emphasiz-
ing that the Rehabilitation Act requires an individualized inquiry, the
court characterized the defendant's action as an employment decision
based on stereotyping. 244 Moreover, the First Circuit rejected MHRH's
concern about an increase in absenteeism as a basis for denying em-
ployment because the Rehabilitation Act requires employers to accept
absenteeism as a reasonable accommodation for the disabled. 2"
the court determined that Ms. Cook's proven record of performance
in the same job for over five years and MHRH's own nurse's report
232 Id.
238 Id.
239 See ed. at 26.
241i Id. The court distinguished the precedents cited by the defendant as cases in which the
applicant failed to qualify for a job possessing unique qualifications rather than general ones. Id.
(distinguishing Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. 739, among others). The First Circuit emphasized the
"significant legal distinction between rejection based on a job-specific perception that the appli-
cant is unable to excel at a narrow trade and a rejection based on [a] more generalized perception
that the applicant is impaired in such a way as would bar her from a large class of jobs." Id.
(concluding that the latter rejection substantially limits an applicant's ability to work).
241 See Cook II, 10 F.3d at 26.
242 s„ id.
243 1d. at 27.
244 Id. (citing to Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, for support). The court stated that	 rejection
of Ms. Cook was "a graphic illustration of an employment decision based on stereotyping —
exactly the sort of employment decision that the Rehabilitation Act seeks to banish." Id.
245 1d, at 27 & n.11; see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (regarding reasonable accomodations required
by employers).
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that plaintiff had passed her physical exam supported a finding that
plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" for the IA-MR position. 246
Finally, in addressing the fourth element of Ms. Cook's § 504
claim, the First Circuit held that MHRH declined to hire the plaintiff
"due solely to" her morbid obesity. 247 The court determined that de-
fendant's stated reasons for not hiring Ms. Cook—that she put herself
at risk because of her obesity, her impeded ability to evacuate patients,
and the increased chance of Workers' Compensation injuries—were
all related to the plaintiff's weight."' Because the defendant failed to
offer any non-discriminatory reasons for its hiring decision, the court
concluded that a jury would be hard pressed not to find that MHRH
rejected Ms. Cook "due solely to" her morbid obesity. 249
Because Bonnie Cook presented sufficient evidence to prove each
of the four elements of a § 504 claim, the First Circuit concluded that
MHRH illegally discriminated against her on the basis of her weight. 25°
In reaching its holding, the Cook court rejected the defendant's rea-
soning that arguably mutable or voluntary conditions are exempted
from statutory protection."' Moreover, in its conclusion, the First Cir-
cuit emphasized that federal disability law was enacted to combat.
discrimination based on the type of negative stereotypes that society
unjustly associates with the overweight."'
V. THE RECOGNITION OF OBESITY AS A DISABILITY: TOWARD
ENDING WEIGHT DISCRIMINATION
What is to be done about this problem? . . . [T]he extension
of the Americans with Disabilities Act to include the over-
weight ... would certainly be a beginning 258
24e Cook II, 10 F.3d at 27-28. Plaintiff weighed about the same amount when she previously
worked in this position. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 8-9, Cook II, 10 F.3d. 17 (No. 93-1093). In
1981 she weighed 240 pounds and in 1983 her weight had reached 300 pounds (height and
weight tables introduced by MIIRLI classified a woman of plaintiff's stature as morbidly obese at
234 pounds or more). Id. at 9 & n.12.
247
 Cook 11, 10 F.3d at 28.
298 Id. at 28 & n.13. Additionally, MHRH's appellate brief states that Dr. O'Brien "declined
to give medical clearance to hire the plaintiff based solely on her weight." Brief of Defendant,
Appellant at vii, Cook II, 10 F.3d 17 (No. 93-1093); see also Cook II, 10 F.3d at 28 n.13.
249 See Cook II, 10 F.3d at 28.
250 See id.
251 Id. at 23-24 & n.7.
252 See id. at 27, 28. In its summation, the First Circuit made clear its position on weight
discrimination: "In a society that all too often confuses 'slim' with 'beautiful' or 'good,' morbid
obesity can present formidable barriers to employment. Where, as here, the barriers transgress
federal law, those who erect and seek to preserve them must suffer the consequences." Id. at 28.
258 Stunkard & Sorensen, supra note 41, at 1037 (regarding the problem of prejudice against
obese persons).
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In recognizing morbid obesity as a federally protected disability,
the First Circuit has taken a significant step toward eradicating weight-
based discrimination. Although limiting its holding in Cook to morbid
obesity, the court's reasoning was not based on the number of pounds
that Bonnie Cook was overweight. 2• 4 Rather, the court correctly focused
its analysis on society's stereotypical perceptions of overweight people
that promote discrimination. 2n
Future courts should endorse the First Circuit's reasoning and
extend the holding in Cook beyond morbid obesity to the prohibition
of all weight discrimination. Although not addressed in Cook, courts
should consider obesity as an actual disability because, in its more
advanced stages, obesity satisfies each of the terms within the statutory
definition. Additionally, under a perceived disability analysis, courts should
extend federal protection to all stages of obesity because of the societal
perception that being overweight is a disabling condition.
A. Obesity May Be Considered an Actual Disability
Ample evidence supports the conclusion that obesity, at least in
its more advanced stages, satisfies the statutory definition of an actual
disability. 25" The disease of obesity is a "physical or mental impairment"
that affects "major life activities," and opposing arguments that obesity
is a voluntary or mutable condition are misguided. 257 Whether obesity
"substantially limits" a major life activity, however, is a harder question
that must be decided on a case by case basis. 2"
First, obesity is a "physical impairment" because it is a physiologi-
cal condition that affects several bodily systems.'" The physiological
causes of obesity include metabolic dysfunction, lack of' appetite sup-
pression signals to the brain, genetic disposition, and an abnormal
number and size of fat cells. 26° Additionally, studies of identical twins
reared apart and adopted children in households with obese family
members demonstrate that obesity is predominantly caused by genetic
factors and is not the result of environmental factors. 2"' And, health
254 See Cook 11, 10 1 7.3d at 27, 28.
255 See id.
256 See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal statutory
definitions of disability.
257
	 supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disease of obesity.
255
	 .supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the meaning of "sub-
stantially limits."
259 See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disease of obesity.
2° See Willard, supra note 22, at 2099.
261 See Stunkard et al., The Body-Mass Index of Twins Who Have Been Reared Apart, supra note
27, at 1483; Stunkard et al., An Adoption Study of Human Obesity, supra note 28, at 193. See supra
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evaluations of the obese population convincingly demonstrate that this
disease markedly affects at a minimum the musculoskeletal, metabolic,
cardiovascular, digestive and respiratory systems 2b 2
Similarly, compulsive overeating disorders, which arguably result
in a voluntary form of obesity, may very well satisfy the definition of
"mental impairment."'" The HHS regulations define "mental impair-
ment" as any mental or psychological disorder. 264 Therefore, because
specialists consider compulsive overeating as a psychological disorder
similar to bulimia and anorexia nervosa, a resulting condition of obe-
sity would appear to qualify as an actual impairment.'"
In contrast, arguments pertaining to the voluntary or mutable
nature of obesity have no statutory basis and rarely apply to obesity.
Nowhere within the text of the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA is there
any mention of voluntariness or mutability as an automatic disqualifier
for recognizing a particular condition as a physical or mental impair-
ment.'" To the contrary, the implementing regulations of the Reha-
bilitation Act specifically include diseases such as alcoholism and drug
addiction that arguably result from voluntary behavior and may be
mutable. 267 Moreover, obesity is predominantly an involuntary disease
for which no cure is available. 2"8 Proponents of the "voluntary" and
"mutable" arguments mistakenly confuse the treatment of semi-starva-
tion and weight loss with the cure for obesity. Such treatment, however,
does not correct the metabolic dysfunction of an obese individual, and
may result in harmful side effects. 269
notes 25-29 and accompanying text for further discussion of studies commenting on the genetic
etiology of obesity.
262 See Willard, supra note 22, at 2099; Hautvast & Deurenberg, supra note 30, at 67.
263 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(i)(B).
264 See id. "Mental impairment" is defined as "any mental or psychological disorder, such as
. emotional or mental illness... ." Id.
263 See Mil ton v. Kline, Hypnotherapy in the Treatment of Obesity, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPWTS
OF OBESITY: A HANDBOOK 268, 268-89 (Benjamin B. Wolman ed,, 1982) (author classifies
anorexia nervosa, bulimia and obesity under the term feeding disturbance, a type of obsessional
disorder). Additionally, obesity is often associated with diminished self-esteem and depression,
further evidence that obesity may fit within the definition of mental impairment. See Benjamin
B. Wolman, Depression and Obesity, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF 0 BF-SITY: A HANDBOOK 88, 88
(Benjamin B. Wolman ed., 1982) (discussing his clinical practice in treating obese patients for
over thirty years, author states that all of his patients "suffered from various degrees of depression
and were torn by feelings of helpless anger directed toward themselves").
266 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.CA.§ 706 (West Stipp. 1993); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1993).
267 See 45 C.F.R. § 84, App. A., Subpart A(4).
266 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment and the
lack of cure for obesity.
266 See supra note 35 for a discussion of the side effects of dieting. A similar argument that
is also easily dismissed is that obesity is controllable and should, therefore, not be considered a
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Second, the disease of obesity clearly affects "major life activi-
ties." The implementing regulations define "major life activities" as
everyday functions such as walking, breathing, performing manual
tasks and working. 27 ' The Cook case illustrates that medical profession-
als consider obesity to limit one's ability to walk, lift, bend, stoop, kneel
and work—functions which fit within the above definition. 272 The har-
der question then is whether obesity "substantially limits" these activities.
Only those persons who are moderately or morbidly obese, as
opposed to those who are mildly obese, are likely to satisfy the require-
ment that their impairments "substantially limit" major life activities. 273
The EEOC regulations implementing the ADA define substantially
limited as significantly restricted in performing major life activities. 274
Therefore, only the more severe conditions of obesity would likely
significantly restrict one's ability to perform everyday functions such
as walking, sitting or working. Accordingly, and as the regulations
suggest, this determination should be made on a case by case basis,
taking into account the severity, duration and long term impact of the
obese condition. 275
In sum, obesity, in its more extreme stages, is likely to satisfy all of
the requirements of an actual disability. Therefore, victims of obesity
discrimination should pursue their claims, and courts should sustain
them, under an actual disability theory if their conditions are substan-
tially limiting ones. In the alternative, claimants of obesity discrimina-
tion should base their claims on the much stronger argument that
obesity is a perceived disability.
B. Obesity Is a Perceived Disability
Because obesity is perceived by much of society as a disability, it
falls well within the grasp of federal disability law. Studies that depict
disability. See Frierson supra note 62, at 293-94 for a discussion of this argument. The author
notes that other controllable diseases such as epilepsy and diabetes are considered disabilities
under federal law. See id.
27° See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
271 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) ("functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working").
272 See Cook 11, 10 F.3d at 25 (referring to statements made by Dr. O'brien and supported by
the decision-makers at MI-1R11).
.17 See supra notes 82-84 for a discussion of the meaning of "substantially limits."
274 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
275 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j) (2). Furthermore, in its amicus curiae brief on behalf of Bonnie
Cook, the EEOC emphasized to the court that "(Wien: is no reason why this approach is
unreasonable or unworkable in the specific case of obesity," and it. suggested that "whether an
individual's obesity is a covered disability turns on the duration of the condition and its long-term
impact." Brief of the EEOC as Amieus Curiae at 13, Cook 11, 10 FM 17 (No. 93-1093).
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a wide range of negative stereotypes associated with obesity demon-
strate that Americans perceive obesity as a "physical impairment" af-
fecting "major life activities."276
 Additionally, the stigma of obesity has
resulted in extensive employment discrimination, proving that society
perceives the obese as "substantially limited" in their ability to work. 277
Whether or not it is a physiological disorder, obesity is a physical
impairment because society perceives it as one. The law is clear that
an individual need only be regarded as disabled to prevail on a per-
ceived disability claim.278
 Therefore, even without medical evidence
that obesity is a physical impairment, victims of obesity discrimination
can prevail by merely showing that their employers' perceptions of
their conditions match with that of the rest of society. 279 Additionally,
the stereotype that overweight people are slower, more easily tired, less
mobile and less hardworking than persons of normal weight would
likely be found by most courts to constitute a perception that obesity
affects "major life activities. "280
Demonstrating that a person's obesity was perceived as "substan-
tially limiting" a major life activity is also more easily proven under a
perceived rather than an actual disability analysis. An employer who
discriminates against an obese applicant for a job requiring no unique
physical skills is likely to perceive that applicant as precluded from
similar positions within that particular industry. 281 An employer's single
rejection of an obese person for a job for which she is otherwise
qualified, therefore, constitutes a perception that the applicant is sub-
stantially limited in her ability to work, a major life activity. 282
276
 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the negative stereotypes
associated with the obese.
277 See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of employment
discrimination against the overweight. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA
states that "if an individual can show that an employer . . . made an employment decision . .
based on 'myth, fear or stereotype,' the individual will satisfy the 'regarded as' part of the
definition of disability." 29 C.F.R. part 1630, App. at 406 (1993).
278 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. 706(8) (B)(iii).
'479 See. Cook 11,10 F.3d at 23 (court held that MHRH's stated reasons for not hiring Cook —
its concern over her limited mobility, and a heightened risk of heart disease — proved that it
treated Cook's obesity as if it affected her musculoskeletal and cardiovascular systems).
2&) See jasper Klassen, supra note 43, at 522.
261 See Cook 11,10 F.3d at 26. The First Circuit stated that "[Hf the rationale proffered by an
employer in the context of a single refusal to hire adequately evinces that the employer treats a
particular condition as a disqualifier for a wide range of employment opportunities, proof of a
Far-flung pattern of rejections may not be necessary."
M See id, Although Ms. Cook was not limited in working within the health care industry, the
First Circuit held that MEIRITs perception that she was foreclosed from a wide range of health
care positions constituted a substantial limitation on her ability to work. See id. at 25-26.
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Consequently, under a perceived disability theory, all forms of
obesity are likely to constitute cognizable disabilities within the Reha-
bilitation Act and the ADA. Moreover, because obesity is defined as
beginning at a weight that is twenty percent over one's norm,'" the
reach of federal protection under the perceived disability prong of the
statutes may extend to the majority of those discriminated against on
the basis of their weight. If subsequent courts follow the precedent set
by the Cook court, federal disability law may adequately protect victims
of obesity discrimination.
C. Arguments Against Recognizing Obesity as a Disability are
Unconvincing
The policy arguments made against including obesity as a cogni-
zable disability within federal disability law are based on economic and
freedom of choice theories and are flawed.284 The first argument as-
sumes that extending protection to the obese will open the floodgates
for further extensions of federal disability law which will put an unfair
economic burden on employers. 285 The second argument promotes an
employer's choice in deciding who to hire and is based on the fear
that all impaired applicants who are denied employment will claim
discrimination regardless of the merits of their claims. 2" Both argu-
ments are easily dismissed.
First, ample evidence demonstrates the very real cost to society of
discrimination against the overweight. 287 Protection for the obese will
ease this heavy economic burden on society, and will cost employers
relatively little as few or no accomodations will likely be required to
employ obese workers. 288 Additionally, arguments that more groups will
seek protection are largely based on similar negative and fear driven
stereotypes against such groups. If new impairments satisfy the defini-
283 1..ukert, supra note 18, at 1.
284 See Baker, supra note 59, at 966-68.
285 See id, at 966, 968. The author states that "[elicit:rling protection to obese persons inay
attract the attention of other stigmatized groups in society, who may seek the benefits of being
classified as handicapped." Id. at 968.
2" See id. at 966, 967-68 (author comments on concerns over governmental intrusion into
private decision making of employers).
287 See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the extent of employ-
ment discrimination against the overweight.
288
	 Cook II, 10 F.3d at 27 & n.11. The court explains that the costs of a possible increase
in absenteeism, and other miscellaneous burdens, must be absorbed by employers as a reasonable
accommodation for disabled employees under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. See id, (citing 45
C.F.R. § 84.12 as requiring accommodations such as job restructuring and modified work sched-
ules).
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tion for disability within the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA, then
protection should be granted, and society will likely benefit from the
full employment of the most qualified applicants regardless of their
impairments. Arguments grounded in fear and ignorance should not
prevent the progress of American society toward a discrimination-free
workplace.
Second, the argument promoting an employer's freedom of choice
fails because federal disability law does not prevent an employer from
hiring the most qualified applicants. Rather, it encourages this practice
and requires that claimants prove that they were "otherwise qualified"
and rejected "due solely to" their impairments. Selecting unimpaired
candidates over impaired ones for legitimate reasons such as being
better trained or more qualified is perfectly lega1. 289 Additionally, if an
employer faces a groundless claim of discrimination by an impaired
applicant, it merely has to rebut the claim with evidence of a non-dis-
criminatory reason for its decision. 29° Federal disability law, therefore,
is not an excuse for the unqualified disabled; it is a form of necessary
protection for the qualified disabled who face unwarranted discrimi-
nation by employers who make hiring decisions on the basis of negative
stereotypes.
Vt. CONCLUSION
Every person, regardless of size, has the right to a life of
dignity and respect.m
The First Circuit's holding in Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of
Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals that morbid obesity is a pro-
tected disability under federal disability law is an important first step
toward ending discrimination against the overweight. In light of the
grave cost to American society that this stereotype driven form of
2e9 See Cook 11, 10 F.3d at 26-27. An employer may also reject a disabled applicant if a specific
inquiry of that applicant reveals that she fails to satisfy bona fide job qualifications that are
legitimate prerequisites for the job. See id. at 26. See supra notes 243-247 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the distinction between rejection based on a job-specific perception that the
applicant is unable to excel at a narrow trade and a rejection based on generalizations about the
applicant's class.
290
 See Cook 11, 10 F.3d at 28. See Baker, supra note 59, at 966, for an argument that
appearance cannot be used by employers as a bona fide job qualification to disqualify obese job
applicants. The author explains that the similar contention that appearance was a business
necessity was used by employers to perpetuate racial discrimination against African Americans
and was rejected by the EEOC as an illegitimate business reason. See id
29] NATIONAL ASSOCIATION To ADVANCE FAT ACCEPTANCE (unpublished pamphlet available
from NAAFA) (describing the ultimate message of the organization). See supra note 6 for more
information regarding NAAFA.
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discrimination has created, however, further protection is required.
Although Congress has not spoken directly to this issue, the Rehabili-
tation Act and the ADA contain the necessary safeguards to prevent
obesity discrimination. Moreover, because the Cook court's reasoning
does not focus on the number of pounds that an obese individual is
overweight, subsequent courts should be successful in extending its
holding to all levels of obesity under a perceived disability analysis. The
other federal circuits should follow the First Circuit's lead and put an
end to discrimination against the overweight.
WILLIAM C. TAUSSIG
